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When George W. Bush threw down his infamous gauntlet
in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001 –
‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’ –
he intended the apparent choice presented in this im-
perative to offer no choice at all. In Queer Terror, Heike
Schotten flips around the apparently self-evident nature
of this choice to ask how anyone committed to the de-
struction of settler colonial empire could not choose the
terrorists. There is something both audacious and limit-
ing about the symmetry of this logic. Audacious, because
we are invited to offer our allegiance to the very forces
and discourses that empire finds most threatening. Lim-
iting, because our choices seem, well, limited to those
offered by this self-same empire. Yet whatever choice
one makes or refuses to make, the dilemmas elucidated
by this provocative work are ones that are likely to en-
dure, making an engagement with its arguments both
fruitful and inescapable.
Schotten attributes the persistence of ‘war on terror’
discourse to a ‘civilisationalist moralism of life and death
that underpins, motivates, and defines the US imperial
project’, the purpose of which is to sanctify settlement
and empire as good while vilifying resistance to it as evil.
Queer Terror offers an anatomy of this moralism, in an
attempt both to rethink the biopolitics of empire and
to sharpen resistance to it. Central to the book is the
claim that the notion of ‘life itself’ is not a self-evident,
natural or biological category, but an ideological one
imbued with moralised content. Against the tendency
to think of life in biologised terms, evident in the con-
trasting treatments of ‘bare life’ offered by Arendt and
Agamben, Schotten demonstrates how the Hobbesian
commitment to the preservation of ‘life’ against the pu-
tatively nihilistic threats posed by everything from indi-
genous ‘savagery’ to ‘Islamist terrorism’ is an intensely
moralistic endeavour that seeks to shore up settler colo-
nial civilisation. For ‘life’, then, always read ‘our way of
life’.
In temporal terms, Schotten reads the settler
colony’s commitment to the preservation of ‘life’ as a
commitment to futurism. In an illuminating reading of
Hobbes, Schotten suggests that in looking for a mech-
anism by which ‘life’ might be preserved forever, the Le-
viathan is engaged in an obviously futurist endeavour. In-
deed she goes further, arguing that the Leviathan brings
the state of nature to an end in part through the cre-
ation of a sense of temporality and, specifically, futurity.
This is because the ceaseless struggle of each against all
to secure one’s present existence in the state of nature
makes the past irrelevant and the future unimaginable
because it is so tenuous. The state of nature is charac-
terised not only by the ever-present physical threat of
death, but also by the psychic condition of hopelessness,
diffidence and despair. The sovereign brings war to an
end by securing the possibility of a future. Much later,
game theorists would deploy this insight to argue that
rational self-interested actors could be induced to co-
operate through the lengthening of the shadow of the
future.
How better, then, to destroy the settler colonial so-
cial order than to refuse the future, and not merely this
future but the future per se. Enter queer theory – and, in
particular, Lee Edelman’s singular antifuturist manifesto
No Future. Widely hailed as helping to inaugurate the
antisocial turn in queer theory, Edelman attacks the ideo-
logy of what he calls ‘reproductive futurism’ which, in
his view, invokes and deploys figurations of the Child as
a representation of the innocence that must be protected
from the perversity and narcissism thought to be em-
bodied by queers. Rather than working to disabuse this
ideology of its moralistic and relentlessly negative view
of queerness, Edelman urges queers to embrace the role
ascribed to them as destroyers of the social fabric and
to become the very exemplars of negativity and death
that it most fears. Schotten proceeds by way of analogy
with Edelman’s argument, while also enlarging its scope
and shifting scale. Thus, where Edelman takes aim at
reproductive futurism, Schotten’s target is a more gen-
eral logic of futurism underpinned by the supposition
that the body politic must survive. What makes futurism
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oppressive, Schotten explains, is its insistence that every-
one accede to its moralistic mandates and its relentless
queering of those who do not. Just as ‘queerness’, for
Edelman, names not an identity category but a structural
position marking those who are abjected as standing in
the way of the future of the Child, ‘terrorism’ for Schot-
ten is not an analytical category naming a particular kind
of violence but the epithet with which resistance to em-
pire and settler colonialism is illegitimated. We might
think of Queer Terror, then, as a reading of the geopolit-
ical implications of No Future in the era of the ‘War on
Terror’.
Schotten is acutely conscious of the critiques to
which No Future has been subject in the fifteen years
since its publication. Disavowing any intention to defend
the text against all of these, she nonetheless focuses on
two. Critics such as Jack Halberstam have worried about
No Future’s too easy slippage from the antisocial to the
apolitical. After all, Edelman’s Nietzschean critique of
the freedom-denying effects of moralism also extends
to the moralism of revolutionary desire, so that the only
‘better’ future (if it can be called one at all) is the death
of the social order as well as the calls for justice that em-
anate from it. In response, Schotten argues that we do
not need to take Edelman at his word when he claims to
reject politics per se. As she astutely points out, to advoc-
ate for anything at all, and to do so in a text that adopts
the rhetorical forms and conventions of a manifesto by
purporting to answer the question that all manifestos do
(what is to be done?), is to adopt a future-oriented posi-
tion. A politics of no future is therefore both a politics
and a future – one that advocates neither capitulation to,
nor compromise with, futurism’s mandates, but instead
urges us to accede to its worst nightmares.
José Muñoz, among others, has pointed out that
the antisociality of Edelman’s polemic is achieved at
the expense of viewing sexuality as a singular trope of
difference, uncontaminated by gender, race and other
particularities. Muñoz does not recognise queer of col-
our children in the sanctified figural Child in whose in-
terest futurism operates. And we might wonder, with
him, whether only those queers most able to inhabit the
present can afford to disavow the future. This is why
Muñoz thinks of the future as queerness’s domain, as
a temporal space that might offer refuge from the in-
justice of the present. Recognising the force of this cri-
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tique, Schotten argues that while the concrete referents
for queerness in Edelman’s text are primarily white, gay
and male, because queerness is treated as a structural
position, his thesis is not incompatible with the now
substantial queer of colour scholarship demonstrating
how as privileged queers assimilate into the mainstream,
queerness becomes displaced onto other figures such
as the Muslim fundamentalist and the illegal alien. Im-
portantly, she concedes that futurity and survival do not
mean the same things in canonical theory as they do in
traditions of the oppressed. The problem is that Schot-
ten does not give us much of a sense of these ‘traditions’
and of how they might compel us to alter our views of
futurity and futurism.
The implications of this become more apparent in
the final chapter of the book, which situates its thesis
more firmly in contemporary ‘war on terror’ discourse.
Here Schotten applies her understanding of queerness as
naming the position of those abjected by the social order,
and the praxis of queerness as entailing the affirmation
of that abjection rather than flight from it, to the ques-
tion of ‘terrorism’. Offering a genealogy of the concept in
political discourse that reveals it to be less an analytical
category than a term of illegitimation, Schotten argues
that if ‘terrorism’ is the name that the imperial settler
state gives to its existential nightmares then resistance
to it entails affirming ‘terrorism’. In her words, ‘If the
only options are, as Bush says, to side with a futurist,
settler, and imperial “us” (whether as avowed advocates
of empire or its collaborationist liberal compromisers)
or with a queered, “savage”, and “terrorist” other, the
choice, I think, is clear: we must choose to stand with
the “terrorists”.’ But are these the only options? In The
Intimate Enemy, Ashis Nandy long ago suggested that
the most subversive responses to colonialism were those
that did not simply negate or invert the binary options
offered to them by colonial discourse but deconstructed
and refused them altogether.
What Schotten intends to suggest, I think, is that
these are the only options that are legible to Bush, and,
by extension, imperial settler colonialism, and that the
affirmation of the ‘wrong’ option within these terms is
deeply threatening to that order. This becomes clear
in her narration of highly mediatised instances of con-
frontation in which Muslim US activists have frequently
been invited to choose between ‘us’ and the ‘terrorists’
and have typically found it impossible to render their
opposition to US policy legible in any terms other than
‘terrorism’. Here Schotten is rightly suspicious of liberal
attempts at compromise,which invariably produce insidi-
ous differences between ‘good’ and ‘bad’Muslims thereby
retaining the sense of Islam as a potential problem. And
she is also right to be pessimistic about prospects for the
expansion of the terms of mainstream discourse given
the all too familiar structural constraints of state regu-
lation and corporate media ownership that frame these
conversations. Yet her argument makes me wonder what
might be lost in its insistence on offering resistance in
terms that are legible to the imperial settler state. Why
be the opponents that it wants and, in some sense, cre-
ates? Might sovereignty not be threatened far more by
what it does not and cannot know or understand, by the
‘unknown unknowns’, as Donald Rumsfeld might have
put it?
And what would it mean for us – ‘us’ who stand
against settler colonial empire – to embrace our status
as ‘terrorists’ rather than to protest that we are ‘freedom
fighters’? What are the consequences of naming and un-
derstanding ourselves – of becoming legible to ourselves
– entirely in the terms imposed by the coloniser? Fanon
was deeply preoccupied with this question, theorising
the epidermalisation of inferiority as the result of self-
recognition in the terms offered by the dominant other.
Indeed we might understand the enduring hunger for al-
ternative world-making, of which the surge of interest in
Afrofuturism is but onemanifestation in our own time, as
the reparative dimension of this Fanonian insight. Schot-
ten is right that all futurisms are destined to fail because
the future can never finally or fully arrive. But if some
futures are more emancipatory than others, then their
failures also mean very different things for the world. A
manifesto against futurism that hesitates to enter into
these distinctions for fear of reintroducing moralism,
this time in the guise of appropriately revolutionary de-
sire, may have the virtue of logical consistency. But it
threatens to bracket a great many of those questions that
we have come to call political.
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